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Abstract 
It remains contested whether peacekeeping works. The impact of peacekeepers’ actions at the 
local (or subnational) level for overall mission success has lately received critical attention. 
Local peacekeeping is expected to matter because it re-assures local actors, deters resumption 
of armed hostilities, coerces parties to halt fighting, and makes commitment to agreements 
credible. Thus peacekeepers affect the relations between central and local elites and avoid the 
emergence of local power vacuums and areas of lawlessness. This study uses new subnational 
data on the deployment of United Nations peacekeepers.  It uses matching and recursive 
bivariate probit models with exogenous variables for temporal and spatial variation to deal 
with possible non-random assignment of the treatment. It is demonstrated that conflict 
episodes last shorter when peacekeepers are deployed to conflict-prone locations inside a 
country, even with comparatively modest deployment. The effect of peacekeeping on the 
onset of local conflict is, however, less clear-cut.  
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Peacekeeping has become one of the main methods of the international community to resolve 
civil wars. Yet it remains disputed whether peacekeeping operations (PKO) actually reduce 
conflict, and many question whether peacekeepers improve the situation on the ground.1 A 
further difficulty is to integrate mixed findings of macro- and micro-level studies. A 
significant body of research finds that UN peacekeepers select so-called ‘hard cases,’ or civil 
wars that are difficult to settle;2 but deployment to a country with a civil war need not imply 
that peacekeepers are operating in actual conflict ‘hot-spots’.3   
Recent quantitative studies on peacekeeping have shifted their focus from the mission 
as a whole to specific activities and policies as well as the precise geographical area of 
operations. Authors14 find that UN missions reduce mistrust between belligerents conditional 
on the size of the mission and the balance of power between rebels and government forces. 
Further, Hultman, Kathman and Shannon5 provide strong evidence that UN missions tend to 
save civilian lives. Costalli6 studies subnational variation in the presence of UN peacekeepers 
in Bosnia and highlights that the UN is active where there has been high level of violence 
against civilians, however, without necessarily diminishing the level of violence. Fjelde, 
Hultman and Nilsson demonstrate that the more peacekeeping forces are locally deployed, 
the less likely that the belligerents will carry out attacks against civilians.7 Our analysis 
                                                            
1 Autesserre 2010; Pouligny 2006. 
2 Sambanis and Doyle 2007; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Hegre et al. 2011. 
3 Authors3 2015; Braithwaite 2005. 
4 Authors1 2013. 
5 Hultman et al. 2013; 2014. 
6 Costalli 2013. 
7 Fjelde et al. 2015. 
4 
considers the impact of peacekeeping on the onset and duration of local armed conflict, 
defined as the organized and armed use of violence between governmental and rebel forces at 
a particular locality.8  
For a number of reasons, it is reasonable to expect peacekeeping at the local level to 
matter. Although elites generally negotiate peace agreements at the national level, peace is 
often ‘won locally’. Peace agreements and ceasefires provide opportunities for government 
and rebel authorities to strengthen their hand, and peacekeepers assist the peace process by 
providing transparency about the actions of government and rebel leaders. Peacekeepers can 
also compensate for lack of elite control over areas where the conflict has left a power 
vacuum. Although monitoring depends less on deployment size, more peacekeepers are 
needed to effectively patrol and control areas. Alternatively, peacekeepers can be called upon 
to address local conflict dynamics, highlighting local grievances, interests and sources of 
power often caught up in the broader conflict.9 Peacekeeping matters by separating local from 
national issues and reassuring that national agreements provide sufficient local gains. Where 
a modest local presence may enable peacekeepers to mediate, a substantial presence of 
peacekeepers is needed to deal with spoilers and breakaway factions relying on their local 
powerbase to pursue local agendas. By reducing local conflict, peacekeeping also affects 
national-level stability. Effective peacekeeping halts the escalation and spread of conflict, it 
maintains trust in the peace process, and avoids zones of lawlessness. All these elements are 
essential to support nationwide peace agreements. 
                                                            
8 The research design section elaborates the operationalization. Our contribution is within the 
study of civil wars and conflict dynamics between belligerents. We do not aim, in this 
article, to study one-side violence or violence against civilians. 
9 Kalyvas 2006. 
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Our empirical analysis uses new spatially disaggregated UN peacekeeper deployment 
data for eight African countries to examine the effect of peacekeeping on the onset and 
duration of conflict locally. Authors310 find that UN peacekeepers tend to be deployed to 
conflict areas but with a significant time delay, raising the question whether PKOs actually 
contain and deter local conflict. Therefore, we use matching techniques as well as recursive 
bivariate probit regression to take into account possible non-random assignment of the 
subnational deployment of peacekeepers. We find that UN peacekeeping reduces the duration 
of conflict locally. The presence of peacekeepers already matters, but if more peacekeepers 
are deployed to a particular locality, they shorten conflict episodes more effectively. The 
evidence is inconclusive for the ability of peacekeepers to deter the onset of local conflict.  
The next section elaborates the arguments on the local dynamics of conflict and 
peacekeeping and argues specifically why the local deployment of peacekeepers matters for 
the onset and duration of conflict. Section three outlines the research design, while section 
four presents the main empirical findings. Section five concludes. 
 
How Local Peacekeeping Matters 
Peacekeepers may enhance the prospects for peace locally in different ways. Recently so-
called robust peacekeeping has received most attention, but apart from enforcement, 
peacekeepers can also strengthen peace agreements via credible commitment, deterrence, and 
re-assurance. Notably, all these mechanisms are ultimately implemented subnationally. The 
four distinct mechanisms specify how the presence of peacekeepers locally and their 
deployment size relates to conflict onset and duration.   
 
                                                            
10 Authors 3 2015. 
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MONITORING AND CREDIBLE COMMITMENT Rebels and government regularly continue to 
compete for territorial control and the ‘post’-conflict loyalty of the local population, and 
opportunism remains a salient conflict mechanism. Even if their relative military strength is 
known, government and rebels may remain uncertain about their support among the 
population. The division of territorial control that rebels and government established on the 
battlefield no longer applies, and the end of fighting may encourage locals to express their 
true allegiance. The government also regains access to areas that were out of bounds during 
the war.  
Via monitoring and reporting on activities ‘on the ground’, peacekeepers can 
demonstrate the commitment of the government and rebels to a peace agreement. The 
presence of peacekeepers in specific localities matters because it commits leaders to act 
locally in line with centrally agreed principles. Information about the implementation of the 
peace agreement is crucial for its success, because the peace process provides opportunities 
for the former belligerents to strengthen their positions. Referring to (alleged) behavior of 
rebels during elections in Namibia, Lindley noted that “UNTAG built credibility by being 
honest and not glossing over obvious problems. For example, on September 21, 1989, 
UNTAG reported on the radio that political intimidation was rife and increasing in the North 
as the political campaign got more serious. Intimidations in the North subsided and did not 
threaten the elections”.11 Peacekeepers also act as a third-party guarantor of the original 
agreement. DDR and SSR are common elements of peace agreements that directly affect the 
(military) balance of power. These changes may tempt parties to challenge the terms of the 
original settlement; for example, in the aftermath of the Lomé Peace Accord (1999) between 
the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front’s (RUF), robust 
                                                            
11 Lindley 2007: 148. 
7 
peacekeeping resolved the commitment problems that emerged between the different fighting 
parties.12  
Generally, however, monitoring and providing accurate information does not require a 
deployment in large numbers: the mere presence of UN personnel already creates an 
information flow between the parties allowing them to update their bargaining positions in a 
non-violent fashion.13 The role of peacekeepers to enhance the commitment of elites to the 
peace process supports the following hypothesis for the onset of armed conflict locally: 
 
H1: The onset of armed conflict is less likely in areas where peacekeepers are deployed.  
 
PATROLLING AND DETERRENCE Government and rebel leaders commonly have only 
limited control over the actions of their ‘followers’ who may not feel bound by the terms of 
the agreement.14 Internal clashes within the rebel groups occasionally lead to changes in their 
leadership as, for example, the case of M23 in the DRC illustrates. Subsequently, the new 
leadership can decide to renege on the original peace agreement. Prunier poignantly describes 
the situation for the eastern Congo: “because there had never been a unified command 
capable of carrying out a coherent centralized strategy, bringing under control the myriad 
feuding units was akin to trying to harness a bunch of wild horses to a cart.”15 So-called 
spoilers have little reason to accept the peace agreement and may even feel threatened by the 
re-establishment of central authority and demands for transitional justice.16  
                                                            
12 Olonisakin 2008. 
13 Powell 2004. 
14 Mitchell 2009. 
15 Prunier 2008: 337. 
16 Kydd and Walter 2002; Nilsson 2008. 
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Peacekeepers deter the onset of local conflict when their presence and actions 
discourage parties to use force. The relation between the government (and rebel) elites and 
spoiler or renegade factions is often complex. During the conflict, elites tend to encourage, 
mobilize and arm grassroots groups with strong local identity and powerbase to fight 
alongside ‘regular’ troops. Autesserre17 details how local social, political and economic 
agendas lead to distinct patterns of violence after the end of civil war. During civil war 
different factions coalesce along a main cleavage giving national elites more prominence, 
while the end of the fighting reduces elite control and encourages the splintering of local 
(armed) groups. In such situations, peacekeepers can deter the resumption of fighting if 
patrolling demonstrates effective control over an area. 
Deterrence differs from commitment: peacekeepers commit if their presence ensures 
that leaders who have retained control over local actors are not tempted to revise the terms of 
the peace agreement. In contrast, peacekeepers deter by compensating for the lack of control 
by leaders (government and rebels alike) over local parties. Deterrence applies to situations 
where local factions operate more independently from national politics, are heavier armed 
and better organized. It is likely to require robust peacekeeping with a sufficient number of 
troops; especially because local ‘grassroots’ groups are not only armed but also often rely on 
a reputation established during the civil war for their social status. The following hypothesis 
is testable at the subnational level: 
 
H2: The larger the presence of UN forces in areas prone to conflict, the lower is the 
probability of conflict onset.  
 
                                                            
17 Autesserre 2010: 126-173. 
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MEDIATION AND REASSURANCE An important element of peacekeeping is to address 
local conflict dynamics, “in particular, disputes that regional and national actors manipulated 
or that could serve as triggers for a renewal of the broader conflict”.18 The failure to address 
local grievances and demands for justice undermines support for the peace process,19 as these 
grievances and agendas can sustain generally low-level conflict. Personal grievances and 
prospects for personal gains often motivate support for either rebels or government, where 
villagers try to use the civil war to settle disputes that are basically local.20 Following civil 
war, refugees and internally displaced people may decide to return home and reclaim ‘their’ 
land and other properties left behind.21 When a population has forged ties with different 
factions, civil war weakens the capacity and legitimacy of local institutions to deal with 
disputes.22 The Capstone Doctrine23 acknowledges the importance of local actors and conflict 
dynamics in sustainable peace building, making the interaction with and involvement of local 
actors more important. 
Peacekeepers can separate local from national grievance by recognizing local 
tensions, providing early warning, and increasing awareness that conflicts often persist in 
parts of the country. Accurate information again plays an important role in dealing with 
ongoing conflict at the local level; for example, in dealing with violent protests in response to 
the arrests of Kosovo Liberation Army heroes by UNMIK in 2002, “UNMIK got the top 
                                                            
18 Autesserre 2010: 194. 
19 Rotberg 2002; Pouligny 2006. 
20 Kalyvas 2006. 
21 Autesserre 2010: 173-174. 
22 Pons-Vignon and Lecomte 2004. 
23 UN DPKO 2008 
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policy people on the TV that night and showed that those arrested had tortured Albanians 
(….). The protests ‘stopped on a dime’.”24  
Wall and Druckman25 report that peacekeepers regularly mediate in local conflicts 
using a broad set of techniques, including gathering information, meeting separately with 
disputants and, if necessary, asking third parties to assist. When peacekeepers mediate local 
disputes or create conditions for other actors (such as NGOs) to provide governance, these 
tasks relate closely to policing local communities. To summarize, peacekeepers can 
effectively mediate in on-going, often low-level, local disputes, where interventions 
frequently rely on civilian rather than military expertise. However, mediation only rarely 
requires robust peacekeeping and relatively small deployments generally suffice. 
 
H3: Armed conflict is less likely to continue in areas where peacekeepers are deployed.  
 
ENFORCEMENT In the aftermath of civil war, neither the government nor the rebels 
tend to have full control over parts of the country, leaving a power vacuum for external, 
transnational, actors. Buhaug, referring to Boulding’s26 Loss of Strength Gradient, argues that 
governments often have only limited control at the periphery, making these areas particularly 
vulnerable.27 Civil war undermines central control, which reveals the weakness of the 
government, increases the availability of arms and encourages meddling from neighboring 
countries. Peace agreements may also limit the control of rebel groups—either because of 
demobilization or by incorporating them into the central authority of a country—without 
                                                            
24 Lindley 2007: 205-206. 
25 Wall and Druckman 2003: 702. 
26 Boulding 1962. 
27 Buhaug 2010. 
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necessarily increasing the control of the central government. The ‘post’-conflict situation in 
the Congo illustrates many of these features; for Rwandese and Ugandan armies as well as 
civilian militias war had “become a way of life” and was taken “to the village level.”28 In 
such cases, peacekeepers have to substitute for lack of effective elite control and to fill the 
power vacuum that prevails in the aftermath of armed conflict. Border areas have received 
the most attention, and are seen as particularly relevant when there is the risk of contagion 
from conflict in neighboring countries. Transferring of resources and weapons and possibly 
direct interference by foreigners create risks for spillover. Peacekeepers can either directly 
halt incursions or stop the use of violence by marauding gangs.  
During and after civil wars, criminal activities and local conflict dynamics often 
become entwined, blurring the distinction between warfare and criminal gang activities.29 
Conflict destroys opportunities for peaceful economic activities and rewards violent behavior, 
often encouraging ‘independent’ local militias and rebel groups to target displaced persons.30 
Often these groups consist of criminal gangs fuelled by drugs and alcohol rather than political 
agendas, such as the ‘armies’ of Prince Johnson and General Butt Naked in Liberia and 
Arkan in the former Yugoslav wars.31 Peace enforcement imposes costs on local belligerents 
outweighing their expected gains from continuing to fight and can thus shorten local conflict. 
Whereas deterrence prevents the outbreak of conflict, intervention aims to halt on-going 
conflict through the application of force; hence follows the empirical implication summarized 
in Hypothesis 4: 
 
                                                            
28 Prunier 2008: 337. 
29 Mueller 2003. 
30 Melander 2009. 
31 Mueller 2003. 
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H4: The larger the presence of UN forces in conflict areas, the lower is the probability that 
conflict continues.  
 
Research Design 
We use spatially disaggregated information on the location of conflict as well as the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces. Our sample includes all major UN missions in sub-
Saharan Africa from 1989 until 2006: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. The 
geographic unit of analysis is a grid cell of 0.5 x 0.5 decimal degrees32 with year as the 
temporal unit resulting in a total of 14,146 observations for the unmatched sample.33  
Figure 1 illustrates the operationalization of the grid structures, as well as the location 
of UN deployment for the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast. The colored grids 
depict areas where UN deployed, where a darker color indicates more peacekeepers in a 
particular grid. Deployment data are estimates based on UN information.34 Peacekeeper 
(PKO) presence is a dummy variable indicating whether a permanent UN peacekeeper base 
exists in a grid during the year. The deployment maps are included regularly in the reports of 
the UN Secretary General and provide additional information on the nature of the contingents 
deployed and the nationality of the peacekeepers deployed at the bases. Accordingly, PKO 
size estimates the number of peacekeepers deployed in a certain area in any given year. 
                                                            
32 0.5 decimal degrees at the equator is roughly 50 km; see Tollefsen et al. 2012 also in 
relation to the discussion one the  “unit modifiable” problem. 
33 The findings presented below are robust for the stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA). 
34 Authors3 2015. 
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The Conflict Site Dataset (CSD) is used to identify the location of violent conflict. CSD 
is an extension to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset and provides coordinates for the 
conflict zones in given countries.35 The CSD data identify a conflict centroid and create a 
buffer around the area. It is important to note that the location of the conflict, both the 
centroid and buffer, changes over time.  
 
Note: this is an over-time grid average. Darker grids correspond to stronger UN deployment 
 
Figure 1: The Distribution of the Number of Peacekeepers – Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory 
Coast 
 
Terrain and geographical distances are likely to influence the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping troops depending on the quality of existing infrastructure. Reliable 
infrastructure is important for the UN to support its operations, and to some extent lack of 
infrastructure explains delays in responding to conflict in outlying areas. Accordingly, the 
                                                            
35 Dittrich Hallberg 2012. 
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models contain a series of factors, such as average travelling time, border distance, and 
capital distance that measure the feasibility and cost of deploying to a certain area.  
Average Travelling Time gives the estimated cell-average travel time (in minutes) by 
land transportation from the cell to the nearest major city with more than 50,000 inhabitants. 
The values are extracted from a global high-resolution raster map of accessibility.36 Border 
Distance is the geographical distance of the center of each cell (centroid) from the 
international borders in kilometers and Capital Distance the distance in kilometers from the 
capital37. The variable Average Mountains measures the roughness of the terrain. The 
variable is constructed as the logged percentage per grid of the land that is covered by 
mountains using data from the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the Food 
and Agricultural Organization (FAO). Since the size of the country and, therefore, the 
number of grids vary considerably, we also control for the total number of grids per country. 
Finally, we add further grid characteristics that could affect the likelihood of conflict such as 
Infant Mortality Rate, a proxy for social and economic development, and Population.38 
Two methodological concerns have determined the choice of estimation technique. 
Firstly, the hypotheses relate to the probability of conflict onset and duration. Onset of 
conflict implies that there was no violent conflict in the previous period, while duration of 
conflict implies the presence of conflict in the previous period. First-order Markov models 
provide appropriate estimators to compare the effects of covariates on the probability of onset 
with their effects on the duration of subnational conflict. Markov transition models can be 
expressed as a system of two equations using a logit link: 
 
                                                            
36 Nelson 2008. 
37 Tollefsen et al. 2012.   
38 Tollefsen et al. 2012. 
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Beck, Katz and Tucker39 demonstrate that binary time-series cross-section (BTSCS) 
analysis with temporal dependency is essentially a grouped duration model. Markov 
transition models allow the inclusion of covariates that affect the probability of onset, the 
probability of duration, or both probabilities. The likelihood of transitions between states or 
duration at the same state is estimated by conditioning on the outcome of the previous period. 
Conflict onset is analyzed by constraining the sample to cases without conflict in the previous 
period. To study the duration of conflict, the sample is constrained to cases with conflict in 
the previous period. In order to take into account further temporal dependence we include a 
cubic polynomial temporal approximation40 for time at peace (when estimating conflict 
onset) or for time at conflict (when estimating conflict duration).   
A second methodological concern is possible non-random assignment of PKO 
deployment in our units under analysis. Peacekeepers might avoid areas with high risk of 
conflict, rendering any correlation between peacekeeping and the absence of conflict 
potentially spurious. Previous research has shown that peacekeepers tend to go to areas with 
conflict in the recent past, but the deployment decisions are often conditional on logistical 
constrains such as travelling distance from urban areas.41 
Given the possible selection bias in deployment, we have opted for two estimation 
strategies to secure robust inferences. Firstly, matching techniques42 are used in preparing the 
                                                            
39 Beck et al. 1998. 
40 Carter and Signorino 2010. 
41 Authors3 2015.   
42 Iacus, King and Porro 2011. 
16 
data before further analysis using logit regression; alternatively we use recursive bivariate 
probit.43 The number of observations of the pre-matched units is 14,146 without PKO and 
736 with PKO. After matching, the number of observations drops down to 1,005 units 
without PKO and 622 with PKO. 
We use the Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM) introduced by Iacus, King and Porro.44 
Contrary to other matching methods, CEM guarantees that the imbalance between the 
treatment and control groups in the specific sample is reduced. In essence, CEM coarsens the 
independent variables and recodes them, so that very close values are grouped together.45 The 
Exact Matching algorithm is subsequently used to detect the matches within the coarsened 
data and to put aside the unmatched cases. Finally, the coarsened values are abandoned and 
the original values of the matched data are maintained for the analysis of the causal effect. 
We include observables in our matching procedure highlighted in previous research on 
peacekeepers’ subnational deployment such as Average Travelling Time, Capital Distance, 
and Border Distance.46 Moreover, we match for grid characteristics identified in the 
disaggregate literature of civil war:  Infant Mortality Rate, Population, Average Mountains, 
and Average Rain Precipitation.47 The matching variables aim to satisfy the 
“unconfoundedness” assumption, which maintains that we have enough controls so that, 
                                                            
43 Greene 2003: 715-716. 
44 Iacus, King and Porro 2011. 
45 Findings are robust for models with alternative matching techniques; see Tables C in 
appendix. 
46 Authors3 2015. 
47 Buhaug 2010. 
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conditional on those controls, treatment assignment is essentially random48 and these 
covariates are known to be unaffected by the treatment.49 
Table 1 reports the multivariate L1 distance before and after the matching. The L1 
distance is a synthetic indicator that summarizes to what extent the two subsamples—regions 
that have experienced peacekeeping and regions that have not—differ in their characteristics. 
The higher the value, the more different the characteristics of the two samples are and the 
higher the need for matching. The value of L1 before matching was 0.95, indicating the 
possibility of sample selection. CEM substantially reduces L1 (from 0.95 to 0.17), providing 
a much more balanced sample. The same table also reports the individual variable L1 
distances for the observables, indicating that all values decreased dramatically (see Figure 2). 
For example, after the matching the observations are much more closely matched on key 
geographical variables (Average Travelling Time) as well as on socio/economic factors (here, 
Population).50 
  
                                                            
48 Wooldridge 2009. 
49 Imbenes 2014: 5. 
50 Since there is variation in the countries’ representation within our sample before and after 
matching, we re-run the models using country-wise sample deletion. Our findings remain 
robust when applying the jackknife approach to the matched sample. Results available upon 
request.  
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Table 1: Similarity of Matched and Unmatched Samples on Key 
Characteristics. L1 Distances. 
  L1 Distance   L1 Distance  
  Before Matching   After Matching 
Average Travelling Time .46  .09 
Population .42  .02 
Average Distance Capital .40  .03 
Infant Mortality Rate .38  .00 
Average Precipitation .31  .01 
Average Distance Border .25  .01 
Mountains .20  .00 
Global L1 Distance  .95   .17 
 
 
 
19 
 
Figure 2: The Impact of CEM Matching on the Distribution of Population and Travelling 
Time. 
 
Matching on observables cannot fully address possible selection bias, hence we also 
report the results of recursive bivariate probit since these models address possible selection 
on unobservables.51 In our empirical analysis, the bivariate probit model accounts for the 
endogenous choice of peacekeeper deployment locally. In line with Maddala,52 we specify a 
recursive bivariate probit of two equations with dichotomous outcomes. The outcome of the 
first regression is PKO presence in a grid, and the dependent variable of the second equation 
is local conflict. Both equations are estimated simultaneously taking into account the 
correlation in the equations’ error processes. Finally, we use the interaction between supply 
                                                            
51 Greene 2003, 715-716. 
52 Maddala 1983, 122. 
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of peacekeepers in Africa and distance to the capital as an exogenous source of variation in 
the PKO deployment equation. 
 
Findings 
Table 2 reports the main results of PKO deployment on conflict applying Markov transition 
models on the matched sample. Model 1 reports the findings for the probability of onset of 
conflict in a grid-year, while Model 2 presents the effect on the probability that conflict 
continues for another year. In both models the key explanatory variable is PKO presence. In 
Model 1, the coefficient of PKO presence is negative but not statistically significant. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 1, we do not find clear support that the presence of peacekeepers 
significantly reduces the probability of conflict onset locally. The coefficient for PKO 
presence is negative and statistically significant in Model 2 and supports Hypothesis 3: the 
deployment of peacekeepers significantly decreases the risk of conflict duration in a 
particular grid. The impact of the deployment of peacekeepers is not only statistically 
significant but also relevant in substantive terms. If peacekeepers are deployed locally, the 
probability that conflicts last for another year in a particular grid decreases by 14%. In 
contrast, PKO presence only has a very small (2%) marginal impact on probability of conflict 
onset, and the effect is not statistically significant. The control variables are consistent with 
the findings in previous studies on the subnational dynamics of conflict.   
A possible concern is that matching techniques only take into account observables in 
determining non-random assignment of the treatment, in our case peacekeepers. Table 3 
provides as alternative estimator an autorecursive bivariate probit that aims to take care of 
unobservable modelling of the correlation of the residuals of the two equations (local 
presence peacekeepers in the first equation and local conflict in the second). The results of 
the bivariate probit regression are in line with the previous analysis. PKO presence fails to 
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significantly decrease the odds of conflict onset in a grid-year. Yet, PKO presence decreases 
the odds that an area with conflict in the previous period continues to experience conflict. The 
findings for PKO presence in Model 4 thus lend further support to Hypothesis 3: PKO 
deployment reduces the duration of conflict in a particular grid.  
Ideally, the bivariate probit regression includes an exogenous source of variation in 
the first equation, but finding an exogenous source of variation with both temporal and 
subnational geographic variation is particularly challenging. Recently, scholars who study 
peacekeeping effectiveness analysing between-countries variation—instead of subnational 
variation like this article—have provided some possible suggestions. Ijaz53 proposes the 
supply of peacekeepers and Vivalt54 the rotation within the UN Security Council as 
instruments for the non-random assignment of peacekeeping. However, these variables do not 
vary within countries, and therefore are not useful for our analysis. 
To find exogenous variation in the first stage of the bivariate probit model, we use an 
interaction between two variables: one a temporal variant and the other a geographic variant. 
The use of an interaction that is exogenous whereas its main terms can be endogenous, has 
been proposed recently.55 In our analysis, the interaction needs to explain theoretically and 
empirically the variation of local UN deployment but not the local level of conflict.  
Accordingly, we use an interaction between supply of peacekeepers in Africa and distance to 
the capital. When there are more flows of peacekeepers in Africa, it is easier to have 
deployment in subnational areas, where we de-trend the variable to avoid historical temporal 
trends. The effect of this supply is subnationally conditional on the distance from the capital, 
                                                            
53 Ijaz 2014. 
54 Vivalt 2015. 
55 First in Economics: Card & Di Nardo 2000; Auer 2013. More recently in Political Science:  
Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman 2016; Esarey 2015. 
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since it is harder to deploy far away from the capital. The interaction theoretically explains 
deployment at local level but not directly local conflict. We also find empirically that logit 
regressions with this interaction explain deployment but not local conflict.56 The first 
(deployment) equation of Model 5 (in Table 3) includes the interaction, but the variables are 
excluded for the second (conflict) equation. Notably, the effect of PKO presence on the 
probability of conflict duration is robust.  
  
                                                            
56 See Table I in online appendix. 
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Table 2: Peacekeeping Presence and the Onset and Duration of Local Conflict; 
Logit Regression on Matched Data 
  (1) (2) 
 Onset of Conflict Duration of Conflict 
      
PKO Presence -0.662 -1.452*** 
 (0.603) (0.262) 
Distance to Borders -0.003 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance to Capital -0.004*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Average Travelling 
Time 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Infant Mortality 0.031** 0.098*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) 
Population 0.013* 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) 
Mountains 4.475*** 0.995* 
 (1.070) (0.533) 
Precipitation -0.006*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Peace years 12.996***  
 (2.748)  
(Peace years)2 -3.487***  
 (0.838)  
(Peace years)3 0.280***  
 (0.077)  
Conflict years  -4.017*** 
  (1.026) 
(Conflict years) 2  1.238*** 
  (0.326) 
(Conflict years) 3  -0.129*** 
  (0.030) 
Constant -11.148*** -8.662*** 
 (3.088) (1.757) 
   
Observations 638 704 
Log Likelihood -66.62 -211.4 
χ2 180.0 309.0 
Pseudo R2 0.575 0.422 
AIC 157.2 446.8 
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Table 3:  Peacekeeping Presence and the Onset and Duration of Local Conflict;  
Recursive Bivariate Probit, Non-matched Data 
  (3) (4) (5) 
 
PKO Onset of PKO Duration of PKO 
Duration 
of 
 
Presence Conflict Presence Conflict Presence Conflict 
  
      PKO 
 
-0.192 
 
-0.741*** 
 
-1.941*** 
  
(0.616) 
 
(0.233) 
 
(0.164)    
Distance to Borders -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)    
Distance to Capital 0.001 -0.030*** -0.003*** 0.001*** -0.003*** 0.001*    
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)    
Average Travelling Time -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)    
Infant Mortality 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.005** 0.041*** 0.013*** 0.039*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002)    
Population 0.030*** -0.001 0.003*** 0.001 0.003**  0.001*   
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)    
Mountains 0.480*** 0.146 0.151 0.272** -0.024    0.337**  
 
(0.150) (0.149) (0.130) (0.117) (0.131)    (0.116)    
Precipitation 0.016*** -0.002*** 0.001* -0.001*** 0.001    -0.001*** 
 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000)    
Peace years -0.423 7.769*** 
    
 
(0.332) (0.625) 
    (Peace years)2 0.083 -2.576*** 
    
 
(0.115) (0.237) 
    (Peace years)3 -0.008 0.222*** 
    
 
(0.011) (0.021) 
    Conflict years 
  
-0.424 -5.234*** -1.558*** -5.009*** 
   
(0.263) (0.221) (0.270)    (0.216)    
(Conflict years)2 
  
0.115 1.493*** 0.332*** 1.426*** 
   
(0.078) (0.059) (0.073)    (0.059)    
(Conflict years)3 
  
-0.006 -0.134*** -0.018**  -0.128*** 
   
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006)    (0.005)    
Africa UN PKO supply 
    
0.004*** 
 
     
(0.000)    
 Distance to Capital* Africa UN PKO 
   
-0.084*** 
     
(0.016)    
 Constant -2.255*** -6.993*** -0.837* 1.340*** -0.354    1.282*** 
 
(0.401) (0.446) (0.464) (0.280) (0.345)    (0.267)    
       Observations 
 
5,579 
 
5,905 
 
5,905 
Log Likelihood 
 
-2117 
 
-2579 
 
-2539 
ρ 
 
0.249 
 
0.114 
 
0.836*** 
    (0.306)   (0.086)   (0.068) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Size of Peacekeeping Deployment and the Onset and Duration of Local 
Conflict; Logit Regression on Matched Data 
  (6) (7) 
 Onset Duration 
      
PKO size -0.211* -0.259*** 
 (0.111) (0.041) 
Distance to Borders -0.003 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Distance to Capital -0.003*** 0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Average Travelling 
Time 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Infant Mortality 0.033** 0.095*** 
 (0.015) (0.013) 
Population 0.014** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.003) 
Mountains 4.971*** 0.797 
 (1.147) (0.538) 
Precipitation -0.006*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) 
Peace years 12.518***  
 (2.782)  
(Peace years)2 -3.369***  
 (0.845)  
(Peace years)3 0.273***  
 (0.078)  
Conflict years  -3.762*** 
  (1.042) 
(Conflict years)2  1.191*** 
  (0.331) 
(Conflict years)3  -0.126*** 
  (0.030) 
Constant -11.441*** -8.737*** 
 (3.170) (1.763) 
   
Observations 638 704 
Log Likelihood -65.34 -206.0 
χ2 182.6 319.9 
Pseudo R2 0.583 0.437 
AIC 154.6 435.9 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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There is evidence that the size of the deployment matters as well. Table 4 reports the main 
results of the Markov transition models using the size of PKO deployment in a grid-year as 
main explanatory variable. The larger the size of the PKO deployment the lower is the risk of 
conflict in a grid-year. Models 6 and 7 respectively show that the size of the PKO has a 
statistically significant effect in reducing the probability of conflict onset as well as duration 
in any grid-year, which supports Hypotheses 2 and 4. The substantive impact of increasing 
the PKO deployment by one unit is to reduce the probability of conflict onset by about 0.7%, 
while it reduces the probability of duration of conflict by about 2%. A graphical presentation 
of the (simulated) effect of increasing the size of PKO deployment is, however, more 
insightful. Figure 3 shows the simulations on the probability of conflict onset based on the 
estimation of Model 6 (Table 4), when the size of the PKO deployment increases to up to 500 
troops. Figure 3 suggests that the local presence of a relatively small number of peacekeepers 
(from no deployment to 50 troops) can decrease the probability of conflict onset from around 
11% to 7%, though within overlapping confidence intervals. The marginal impact of any 
further increase in the number of peacekeepers is negligible. However, the estimated effects 
are very uncertain as shown by the wide confidence intervals and the substantial effect in 
change of probability appears marginal; therefore, we remain uncertain on the local capacity 
of PKO to prevent onset of conflict, and consider the support for Hypothesis 3 as rather weak. 
However, supporting Hypothesis 4, the effect of the size of PKO deployment on the 
probability of the duration of conflict in a grid-year is more informative. Figure 4 shows that 
an increase in the number of peacekeepers (from no troops to 300 troops) reduces the 
probability that conflict continues into the next time period. Even a small deployment of 20 
peacekeepers already reduces the probability that conflict continues in a particular location 
from 90% to 75%.  A more substantial deployment of about 500 peacekeepers reduces the 
probability that the conflict continues down to 48%. However, 500 units appear to be a 
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threshold because the marginal effect of adding further units seems negligible. To put these 
figures in context: the median value of peacekeepers size, where UN is deployed, is 562 
units, the 25% percentile is 150 and the 75% percentile is 1703. 
 
 
Figure 3: Probability of Local Conflict Onset as a Function of the Size of Peacekeeper 
Deployment. Simulations based on Model 6 (Table 4). 
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Figure 4: Probability of Duration of Local Conflict as a Function of the Size of Peacekeeper 
Deployment. Simulations based on Model 7 (Table 4). 
 
As a first robustness test, we have replicated the models using the UCDP-GED data.57 The 
results remain the same for the PKO presence. PKO size is no longer statistically significant 
for the conflict onset, while PKO presence and size both significantly reduce the probability 
that conflict continues in a grid-year. We present grid-year instead for the month-event 
analyses for two reasons. First, the Conflict Site Dataset is compiled on year grid and aims to 
geographically identify areas where a conflict has reached levels of civil war. The UCDP-
GED reports conflict events that do not necessarily identify a civil war. Second, nearly all 
independent variables only have yearly variation and using monthly observations would 
artificially inflate the sample. 
 
                                                            
57 Sundberg and Melander 2013. 
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As additional robustness tests we ran models with the same specifications as in Tables 2 and 
4 but added spatial lags for peacekeepers deployment. Higher values on the spatial lags mean 
that peacekeepers are deployed more proximate to a particular area. The spatial lags for PKO 
size are weighted on the size of the deployment. Figure 5 visually represents the effects of the 
spatial lags.58 The upper two graphs suggest possible diffusion (if PKO deployment is closer 
there appears to be a higher probability of conflict onset), but the confidence intervals 
indicate that the results are not statistically significant. Further, the bottom two graphs 
suggest that closer deployment of peacekeepers decreases the probability of local conflict 
duration. Overall, we conclude that any evidence of the diffusion of conflict because of 
peacekeeping is weak: the evidence that peacekeeping diffuses the onset of conflict is 
positive but insignificant, while the evidence that peacekeepers via diffusion prolong conflict 
is negative and significant. Again, adding the spatial lags of peacekeeping deployment to our 
main specifications does not influence the substantial effects of our main explanatory 
variables. Finally, even controlling for spatial lags of conflict does not affect our main 
findings.59 
 
                                                            
58 We use the one-year temporal lag of the spatial lag to operationalize diffusion and to avoid 
simultaneity bias (see Beck et al. 2006), full models in appendix Table F.  
59 See Table G in the online appendix. 
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Figure 5: Spatial Effects of Peacekeepers Local Deployment on Probability Conflict Onset 
and Duration. 
 
Conclusions 
The local determinants and impact of peacekeepers have attracted relatively little attention 
and the findings are often contradictory. A reason could be that common understandings of 
‘local’ conflate the possible strategic importance of certain localities with endogenous or 
local conflict dynamics. Autesserre60 makes a strong case that the failure of peacekeepers to 
address local conflict dynamics contributed to the difficulties of the UN to build a sustainable 
peace in the DRC. Hultman, Kathman and Shannon and Fjelde, Hultman and Nilsson61 
                                                            
60 Autesserre 2010. 
61 Hultman et al. 2013; 2014; Fjelde et al. 2015. 
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demonstrate that peacekeeping helps to protect civilian lives. Here, we provide evidence that 
peacekeepers also reduce violent confrontations between belligerents. Robust peacekeepers 
fill power vacuums that emerge post-conflict. While the deployment of peacekeepers often 
follows a centrally reached agreement between government and rebel leaders, peacekeepers 
have increasingly had responsibilities to keep the peace locally. Peacekeepers have to deter 
and contain conflict ‘hotspots’, commit parties to the peace process, provide information on 
local developments, and force local actors to stop fighting.  
Effective peacekeeping averts the onset of conflict in a particular locality and halts 
conflict if it emerges anyway. To assess the actual effectiveness of peacekeeping, it is 
necessary to account for possible non-random assignment of the treatment, namely 
subnational PKO deployment. Our analysis proceeds accordingly with the key finding that 
UN peacekeepers contain conflict locally. There is some, however inconclusive, evidence 
that UN peacekeepers may also deter local conflict altogether. UN peacekeepers significantly 
reduce the probability of local conflict continuing for another year. While the mere presence 
of peacekeepers already matters, the impact is stronger if a larger number of peacekeepers are 
deployed. These findings are robust using two different approaches to deal with possible non-
random assignment of subnational peacekeeping. 
The weak effects of peacekeeping on deterring the onset of conflict seem in line with 
the comparatively modest size of peacekeeping deployment, especially given the amount of 
territory that the peacekeepers are expected to control. PKOs simply often lack the capacity 
to effectively patrol their entire area of operations leaving opportunities for violence by 
spoilers. These findings suggest that peacekeepers are unable to deter opportunistic actions 
by elites with either a strong national or local powerbase. Peacekeepers are, however, willing 
and able to respond to local conflict whenever and wherever it emerges. We find strong 
support for the idea that a robust deployment of peacekeeping forces in a particular locality 
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can compensate for the lack of control of central authorities; in other words, places with a 
power vacuum. The presence of peacekeepers—even with modest size—also allows for 
mediation of local grievances supporting the relevance of local conflict dynamics. Although 
peacekeepers seem unable to stop local conflict completely, they are able to prevent it from 
continuing unchecked. Instead of ‘winning’ the peace locally, our findings suggest that 
peacekeepers are able to restore the peace locally with enforcement and reassurance being 
the two main conflict resolution mechanisms.  
Notably, UN PKO missions rarely reach the deployment levels of a military 
intervention. For example, in 2013 the deployment of ISAF forces to Afghanistan peaked at 
approximately 100,000 military personnel. In contrast, the largest UN mission to the DRC 
deployed about 22,000 troops in 2013. The military containment of M23 in DRC in 2013 
highlights that UN PKOs can successfully use targeted military force under an appropriate 
mandate. The UN Force Intervention Brigade under the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) deployed 
approximately 3,000 peacekeepers in North Kivu and carried offensive operations against 
M23, forcing the rebel group to eventually end hostilities. Thus, effective UN peacekeeping 
combines the ability to monitor transgressions with targeted use of military force. 
We recognize the limitations of our study. First, our study covers only major UN 
missions in Africa after the Cold War. Still it provides a new and innovative empirical 
contribution on the local effects of peacekeepers. In our opinion, the tradeoff between limited 
scope and more detailed information on conflict resolution processes seems more than 
acceptable. Moreover, civil wars and peacekeeping missions in the African continent 
represent an important share at global level. Second, we use a minimal conceptualization of 
local peace, operationalized as absence of local conflict, and have left the possible effect on 
positive peace to future research. To some extent, this reconciles our findings with the more 
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negative evaluation of Autesserre62 who considers the impact of wider UN involvement—and 
thus not only the Blue Helmets—on peace building or positive peace. Third, we lack 
information about the precise actions and policies implemented locally by UN peacekeepers. 
Arguably, the latter are crucial for winning the peace locally. Regardless, in our opinion, 
demonstrating that peacekeepers make a difference to local conflict is important. Limiting 
post-conflict violence is crucial to maintain confidence in the peace process and to allow 
‘peace’ to take hold. As shown by events in the DRC, failing to control local conflict poses 
clear challenges to the overall peace process.  Local deployment of UN peacekeepers can 
shorten conflict and, therefore, save lives. 
  
                                                            
62 Autesserre 2010. 
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